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SUBSIDIARITY IN THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION: THE PROMISE OF 
WAIVERS 
ISABEL FEICHTNER*1 
I 
A CHANGE IN PERSPECTIVE: SUBSIDIARITY THROUGH DECISIONMAKING BY 
THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE WTO 
Most inquiries into subsidiarity in the World Trade Organization (WTO) so 
far have concentrated on dispute settlement. The reason for this focus is the 
extensive jurisdiction of WTO panels and the WTO Appellate Body to assess 
the legality of governmental measures aiming at human and animal health, food 
safety, or environmental protection, and their power to engage in lawmaking 
through interpretation.2 By contrast, the political organs of the WTO have 
remained somewhat neglected even though they, too, enjoy significant decision-
making power because of the waiver power in Article IX Paragraph 3 of the 
WTO Agreement.3 This article redirects attention to the WTO’s political organs 
and examines how they can further the principle of subsidiarity in the WTO 
through the exercise of this power. The waiver power is of particular relevance 
for an examination of subsidiarity within the bounded context of the WTO.4 
The significance of the waiver power is that it allows the main political organs—
the Ministerial Conference and the General Council—to suspend upon request 
of a WTO member any obligation of WTO law, thus limiting the reach of WTO 
law. The legality of measures for which a waiver is in effect cannot be assessed 
against the suspended WTO norm. And, in case of a dispute between WTO 
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1.  This article builds on ISABEL FEICHTNER, THE LAW AND POLITICS OF WTO WAIVERS: 
STABILITY AND FLEXIBILITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012). 
 2.  See Tomer Broude, Selective Subsidiarity and Dialectic Deference in the World Trade 
Organization, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 53; see also Matthew Windsor, A Fine 
Balance? Delegation, Standards of Review, and Subsidiarity in WTO Dispute Settlement, 14 AUCKLAND 
U.L. REV. 41 (2008) (arguing for subsidiarity as a standard-of-review principle in WTO dispute 
settlement).  
 3.  Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 154 art. IX, para. 3 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].  
 4.  For the distinction between subsidiarity in bounded and unbounded settings, see Markus 
Jachtenfuchs & Nico Krisch, Subsidiarity in Global Governance, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 
2016, at 1, 8–9. For the application of subsidiarity in the “unbounded” setting of international economic 
governance to guide the choice between bilateral, regional or multilateral economic cooperation, see 
generally Arie Reich, Bilateralism Versus Multilateralism in International Economic Law: Applying the 
Principle of Subsidiarity, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 263 (2010).  
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members concerning the respective measure, the WTO dispute-settlement 
organs will not apply the waived norm. A waiver thus enables members to 
lawfully take measures that, without the waiver, might be found by the dispute-
settlement organs (or other law interpreters and adjudicators) to violate WTO 
law. 
This article exposes the potential of the waiver to further subsidiarity within 
the WTO. It first clarifies how the waiver can promote subsidiarity by 
reconciling the effective realization of international trade law’s objectives with 
the pursuit of domestic policy preferences. Second, it argues that general rules 
and exceptions are not sufficient to accommodate WTO members’ policy 
preferences and that the waiver constitutes an important complement. Third, it 
presents the results of an empirical inquiry into the WTO’s waiver practice, 
which reveals that, to date, the waiver power falls short of its subsidiarity 
potential. Fourth, it therefore proposes a number of changes to the waiver 
process—not requiring any treaty amendments—to increase the likelihood that 
the political organs realize subsidiarity by use of the waiver power. 
II 
SUBSIDIARITY IN THE WTO AND THE POTENTIAL OF THE WAIVER 
Assessing WTO law and practice from a subsidiarity perspective raises the 
question of the objectives of WTO law. According to the understanding of 
subsidiarity on which this article is based, subsidiarity relates questions of 
collective autonomy and self-government, on the one hand, to the effective 
pursuit of certain governance objectives, on the other hand. Applied to an 
international organization like the WTO, subsidiarity entails a presumption for 
the exercise of authority at the member-state level, for it is the member states 
that are most likely to provide procedures for the meaningful exercise of 
collective autonomy and self-government. Yet this presumption can be 
overcome if the realization of common objectives demands the allocation of 
authority to—or the exercise of such authority by—the international 
organization.5 
The following clarifies the conception of the objectives of international 
economic governance; it does not attempt to answer whether subsidiarity is a 
binding norm of WTO law. Rather, subsidiarity is referred to as an external 
normative standard to evaluate the law and practice of waivers in the WTO; 
that is, to assess whether the waiver power may be and is being used to further 
subsidiarity and how certain changes in the waiver process could enhance the 
likelihood that subsidiarity concerns are being promoted in the WTO. More 
concretely, the article examines whether the political organs do and may 
promote subsidiarity by restricting WTO authority (through a suspension of 
WTO norms) in order to allow WTO members to pursue policy preferences 
 
 5.  Cf. Jachtenfuchs & Krisch, supra note 4, at 6–7. 
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that enjoy broad public support6 where this does not endanger the realization of 
WTO objectives. The conception of the objectives of international economic 
governance set forth in the following, and which forms the backdrop of this 
subsidiarity assessment, is not uncontentious. Yet it is supported by a number of 
institutional features, including the waiver power itself. It is informed by the 
desire to maintain the legitimacy of the WTO and to reconcile multilateral trade 
discipline with meaningful self-government. It thus follows from the same 
concerns that underlie the principle of subsidiarity.7 
A. Objectives of International Economic Governance 
Neither scholars nor governments agree on what the objectives of 
international economic governance are or should be.8 This article sides with 
those who propose a “modest” conception of international economic law and 
governance. This modest conception views international economic governance 
as aiming to prevent potentially destructive protectionism while leaving 
sufficient policy space for states to implement measures that may impede trade 
but are regarded as necessary to realize societal preferences. Legal rules and 
principles in this conception have the function—in combination with procedures 
for adjudication—to ensure predictability by distinguishing acceptable (legal) 
from unacceptable (illegal) trade barriers. Thus, with respect to the WTO, this 
conception stresses the need for WTO law to be flexible enough to account for 
different societal preferences within the member states and at the same time to 
provide for binding and enforceable legal norms in order to secure peaceful 
trade relations and predictability for economic actors. 
This understanding is situated in the tradition of embedded liberalism.9 It 
emphasizes not only that international economic governance has to account for 
the fact that societal preferences differ from member state to member state,10 
but also that it has to acknowledge that the economic cannot be neatly 
separated from the political, that markets operate in particular societal settings, 
 
 6.  I understand subsidiarity as protecting collective autonomy and self-government. I focus 
therefore on deference to policy preferences that enjoy broad public support, variously denoted as 
collective or societal preferences.   
 7.  For a subsidiarity-inspired conception of the WTO, see Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, 
Toward a Global Ethics of Trade Governance: Subsidiarity Writ Large, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 
2, 2016. I am much indebted to and draw heavily on Robert Howse’s writings for my own understanding 
of international economic governance.  See, e.g., Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy—and 
Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 AM J. INT’L L. 94 (2002); Robert Howse, 
The Legitimacy of the World Trade Organization, in THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 355 (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen eds., 2001). 
 8.  For an in-depth discussion, see FEICHTNER, supra note 1, at 20–45. 
 9.  See John G. Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism 
in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT’L ORG. 379, 405 (1982); see also Howse & Nicolaïdis, supra note 
7, at 259. 
 10.  Robert Howse & Joanna Langille, Permitting Pluralism: The Seal Products Dispute and Why 
the WTO Should Accept Trade Restrictions Justified by Noninstrumental Moral Values, 37 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 367, 368–69 (2012). 
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and that there are no blueprints for economic development.11 It follows that 
international economic law, while securing a number of ground rules (such as 
nondiscrimination), should leave states the freedom to experiment with 
economic policies and institutions.12 From this stance, a number of outcomes of 
the Uruguay Round—which led to the creation of the WTO—can be criticized 
as going too far in promoting a particular ideal of economic governance and 
foreclosing states’ policy space to experiment.13 
Despite its contestability, this interpretation of international economic 
governance serves as the basis for the following assessment of the waiver. The 
normative concerns that underlie it are the same as those that motivate the 
subsidiarity discourse in international law. Just like the proposed interpretation 
of WTO law, subsidiarity demands that international governance be no more 
intrusive than necessary and that it espouse some flexibility to take account of 
collective preferences as formulated at the regional or national levels. This 
article is indeed aspirational, as pointed out by Tomer Broude,14 in that it 
assesses to what extent the waiver power is or may be used in order to promote 
this normative conception of the WTO and subsidiarity. As Robert Howse and 
Kalypso Nicolaïdis explain in detail, this conception can be developed from and 
linked back to actual features of international economic law, while at the same 
time it cannot be ignored that other aspects of the current international 
economic governance regime stand in stark contrast to its normative 
trajectory.15 
B. The Waiver: Flexibility, Deference, and Maintenance of WTO Objectives 
The particular features of the WTO waiver that constitute its subsidiarity 
potential can be clarified against the background of the conception of 
international economic governance objectives outlined above. 
1. The Waiver Power of the GATT of 1947 and the WTO 
The waiver power in Article IX Paragraph 3 of the WTO Agreement is one 
of few competences of the WTO’s political organs to make binding decisions. It 
allows the Ministerial Conference “[i]n exceptional circumstances . . . to waive 
an obligation imposed on a Member by this Agreement or any of the  
 
 
 
 11.  See generally DANI RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES: GLOBALIZATION, 
INSTITUTIONS, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (2007).  
 12.  Id.; see also ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FREE TRADE REIMAGINED: THE WORLD 
DIVISION OF LABOR AND THE METHOD OF ECONOMICS 2 (2007); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS 
FREEDOM (1999) (discussing the intimate relationship between self-determination and economic 
development). 
 13.  RODRIK, supra note 11, at 195–212; YONG-SHIK LEE, RECLAIMING DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 12 (2006). 
 14.  Broude, supra note 2, at 57 & n.24. 
 15.  Howse & Nicolaïdis, supra note 7, at 260–61, 282–83. 
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Multilateral Trade Agreements, provided that any such decision shall be taken 
by three fourths of the Members . . . .”16 
The waiver power in Article IX Paragraph 3 of the WTO Agreement 
succeeded the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’s (GATT) waiver 
power in Article XXV Paragraph 5 of the GATT of 1947.17 Article XXV 
Paragraph 5 of the GATT of 1947 had authorized the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES18 “in exceptional circumstances not elsewhere provided for” to waive 
any obligation under the GATT of 1947. A waiver decision could be taken by a 
two-thirds majority of votes cast, which had to comprise more than half of the 
contracting parties.19 From the wording, as well as the traveaux préparatoires of 
the London Conference that negotiated the Havana Charter, it appears that the 
waiver power was intended as an emergency exception to allow for a temporary 
suspension of obligations if none of the other escape clauses applied.20 Yet the 
GATT waiver power was in no way used only in emergency situations. As a 
consequence it was called “[p]erhaps the most important single power of the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES.”21 Indeed, a few waivers had been granted 
without time limits and with far-reaching scope. The most prominent and 
contentious of these was the U.S. Agricultural Waiver adopted in 1955.22 This 
waiver, which allowed the United States to maintain import restrictions on 
agricultural products in deviation from GATT disciplines, is interpreted by  
 
 
 
 16.  Apart from this general waiver competence there are a number of specific waiver competences 
in the WTO Agreements, including in: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. VI, para. 6(b), art. 
XVII para. 18, art. XXIV para. 10, Oct. 7, 1957, 278 U.N.T.S. 170 [hereinafter GATT]; Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade art. 12.8, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter TBT Agreement]; 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art. 10.3, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS Agreement]; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights arts. 63.2, 66.1, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]; 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures arts. 27.4, 29.4 Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 
[hereinafter SCM Agreement]; Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures art. 5.3, Apr. 15, 
1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186 [hereinafter TRIMS Agreement].  
 17.  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Jan. 1, 1948, 55 U.N.T.S. at 272 [hereinafter GATT 
of 1947].  
 18.  Under the GATT of 1947, the contracting parties acting jointly were designated as the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES. Art. XXV, para. 1 GATT of 1947. 
 19.  Art. XXV, para. 5, cl. 2 GATT of 1947.  
 20.  The delegate from the United States, Mr. Kellog, stated that the proposed waiver power was 
meant to “cover cases which were exceptional and caused particular hardship to any particular 
member.” U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council of the Int’l Conference on Trade & Emp’t, Verbatim Report of 
the Ninth Meeting of Committee V, E/PC/T/C.V/PV/9, at 8 (Nov. 7, 1946) [hereinafter U.N. Econ. & 
Soc. Council Report]; see also Preparatory Comm. of the Int’l Conference on Trade & Emp’t, Report of 
Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on Articles 52, 54, 55, 59, 60 and 62, E/PC/T/C.V/25, at 3 (Nov. 11, 1946). The 
French delegate at the same meeting stated that the waiver power should allow the suspension of 
obligations if they “would impose some economic hardships on some countries, those hardships . . . 
being of a temporary character,” U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council Report, supra note 20, at 9. 
 21. JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 541 (1969). 
 22.  Waiver to the United States Regarding the Restrictions under the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act, GATT BISD (3d Supp.), at 32 (1955).  
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some to have led to a general deterioration of the GATT obligations in the 
agricultural sector.23 
During the Uruguay Round the waiver power was reviewed. The European 
Economic Community had suggested a reconsideration and reform of Article 
XXV Paragraph 5 of the GATT of 194724 in order “to prevent the perpetuation 
of, or to forestall, virtually permanent privileged situations.”25 The new waiver 
power in Article IX Paragraph 3 of the WTO Agreement still provides for its 
use in “exceptional circumstances.” A more effective limitation on the waiver 
power was introduced with the new voting rules.26 Article IX Paragraph 3 of the 
WTO Agreement requires a majority vote that comprises three-fourths of 
WTO members. In practice (apart from the first eight waiver decisions)27 all 
waivers in the WTO are adopted by consensus—mostly by the General Council 
acting on behalf of the Ministerial Conference.28 This practice is in line with the 
General Council’s decision-making procedures according to which the General 
Council shall seek consensus. The procedures provide for voting when 
consensus cannot be achieved.29 
Article IX Paragraph 4 of the WTO Agreement adds further requirements. 
It demands that waiver decisions state the exceptional circumstances justifying 
the waiver, the terms and conditions governing the application of the waiver, 
and the date on which the waiver shall terminate, and it also requires that 
waivers be reviewed on an annual basis.30 
2. The Subsidiarity Potential of the WTO Waiver 
Three features in particular make the waiver a suitable instrument to 
operationalize subsidiarity in the WTO. It is due to these features that the 
waiver may further international economic governance that reconciles 
 
 23.  ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 42 (2002); JACKSON, supra 
note 21, at 718; KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
ORGANIZATION 260–63 (1970).  
24. 2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986–1992) 1845 (Terence P. 
Stewart ed., 1993). 
 25.  Negotiating Group on GATT Articles, Communication from the European Economic 
Community, MTN.GNG/NG7/W/4, at 2 (May 18, 1987). 
 26.  Obligations that are subject to a transitional period or a period for staged implementation may 
be waived only by consensus decisions. WTO Agreement, art. IX, para. 3 n.4.  
 27.  General Council, Minutes of Meeting, July 31, 1995, Doc. WT/GC/M/6, at 5 (Sept. 20, 1995). 
 28.  All WTO members are represented in the General Council, which exercises the functions of 
the Ministerial Conference when the latter is not in session. WTO Agreement, art. IV para. 2.  
 29.  Statement by the Chairman, Decision-Making Procedures Under Articles IX and XII of the 
WTO Agreement, Nov. 15, 1995, WTO Doc. WT/L/93 (Nov. 24, 1995).  
 30.  The Understanding in Respect of Waivers of Obligations Under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994 includes additional requirements for requests of waivers of GATT obligations. 
 A request for a waiver or for an extension of an existing waiver shall describe the measures 
which the Member proposes to take, the specific policy objectives which the Member seeks to 
pursue and the reasons which prevent the Member from achieving its policy objectives by 
measures consistent with its obligations under GATT 1994.  
Understanding in Respect of Waivers of Obligations Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994 para. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/11-25_e.htm. 
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responsiveness to societal preferences with a commitment to multilateral trade 
discipline. First, the waiver can make WTO law more flexible without 
compromising the formal and binary distinction between binding and 
nonbinding and between legal and illegal that is characteristic of the legal form. 
The waiver neither calls into question that the waived norm forms part of WTO 
law, nor does it relativize its binding nature.31 Rather, it suspends individual 
norms, often with respect to particular measures, for a specified time. As a 
consequence, the suspended norm for the duration of the waiver period is not 
applicable when the legality of a measure covered by the waiver is being 
assessed. 
Second, the waiver can be used to accommodate measures adopted by 
individual member states to realize policy preferences that, without a waiver, 
might violate WTO law. The waiver power thus allows the political organs of 
the WTO to pay deference to member states’ preferences by restricting the 
WTO’s own authority. The interpretation of the exercise of the waiver power as 
a restriction of WTO authority becomes plausible if one focuses on the WTO’s 
internal institutional balance. The political organs, by exercising a power 
allocated to them in the WTO Agreement, are restricting the authority of the 
dispute-settlement organs by preventing them from applying the suspended 
norm if a dispute arises.32 
Third, the waiver is a decision by the main political organs of the WTO 
(usually the General Council acting on behalf of the Ministerial Conference) in 
which all members are represented. Therefore it can be interpreted as an 
assessment by the WTO membership that the suspension of law which is 
effected by the waiver does not endanger the realization of WTO objectives. 
The waiver procedure not only provides the opportunity for the membership to 
continuously debate and revisit the correct conception of WTO objectives, but 
it can also be used to incrementally adjust the law as members’ views on the 
appropriate balance between multilateral trade discipline and domestic policy 
space change. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) Waiver, which relaxes the limitations imposed by the TRIPS 
Agreement on compulsory licensing for the production of essential medicines,33 
may be interpreted in this vein. It can be understood as aligning WTO law with 
the membership’s views as to the proper balance between the international 
protection of intellectual property and members’ capacity to ensure that their 
populations have access to essential medicines. 
 
 31.  For a proposal to accord different degrees of bindingness to WTO norms depending on their 
welfare-enhancing effects, see Joel P. Trachtman, The WTO Cathedral, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 127 (2007); 
Joel P. Trachtman, Bananas, Direct Effect and Compliance, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655 (1999).  
 32.  For a discussion why waivers should be considered secondary law of the WTO, see 
FEICHTNER, supra note 1, at 163–69. 
 33.  Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, WTO Doc. WT/L/540 (Sept. 2, 2003). 
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III 
THE WAIVER AS A NECESSARY COMPLEMENT TO GENERAL RULES AND 
EXCEPTIONS 
One objection that may be raised against conceptualizing the waiver as a 
subsidiarity device is that the legal rules and exceptions of the WTO 
Agreements already provide for sufficient flexibility to reconcile responsiveness 
to domestic preferences with effective international trade discipline.34 Norms 
that make WTO law more flexible include Article XX of the GATT and Article 
XIV of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),35 which allow 
members to take measures in the pursuit of public interests and the rules of the 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) and the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade Agreements (TBT Agreement) that 
take into account differences in societies’ acceptance and management of risk. 
The exceptions to allow for regional integration, Article XXIV of the GATT 
and Article V of the GATS, may also be considered here, as well as those in the 
TRIPS Agreement according to which members may exclude certain products 
from patentability or grant compulsory licenses.36 
Given the flexibility built into WTO law by these norms, it must be asked 
whether the waiver is needed to provide for additional deference to individual 
members’ policy preferences. In response the following sets out the limits to 
providing flexibility through the formulation of general rules and exceptions. 
Against this background the waiver power appears as an important and 
complementary exit option to accommodate policy preferences of WTO 
members. 
A. The Limits of General Rules and Exceptions to Accommodate Collective 
Preferences 
The policy preferences of individual WTO members may be highly context 
dependent and might not lend themselves well to generalization; thus, they 
cannot be fully accommodated by the formulation of general rules or exceptions 
if such norms are not to result in blanket authorizations. The controversy on 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs), which some European states strongly 
oppose, serves as an illustration. The SPS Agreement requires that measures to 
protect against health risks be based on either international standards or a 
scientific risk assessment.37 Where there is no scientific evidence to support the 
existence of a risk, members may “provisionally” adopt measures, but “shall 
 
 34.  For an assessment of such WTO norms from a subsidiarity perspective, see Broude, supra note 
2; Howse & Nicolaïdis, supra note 7. 
 35.  General Agreement on Trade in Services art. XIV, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 
[hereinafter GATS].  
 36.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 16, arts. 27, 30, 31. Further flexibility is provided by the 
safeguard provision in Article XIX GATT and the Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 154, as well as provisions providing for special and differential treatment of developing 
countries.  
 37.  SPS Agreement, supra note 16, at art. 3, paras. 2–3.  
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seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective 
assessment of risk and review the . . . measure accordingly within a reasonable 
period of time.”38 Arguably, this variation of the precautionary principle is 
insufficient to protect against anticipated dangers that may only materialize in 
the distant future.39 The potential dangers, which in several European states 
motivate strong opposition to GMOs, are largely of such a nature. Still, the 
desire to impose a ban on GMOs need not be interpreted as calling into doubt 
the general principles of the SPS Agreement. It does not necessarily implicate 
the claim that the SPS Agreement should include a broader precautionary 
principle. A society that decides to take a broad precautionary approach in one 
specific instance, such as the ban on GMOs, may nonetheless be opposed to the 
inclusion into the SPS Agreement of a general authorization for precautionary 
measures absent scientific evidence for the reason that such a rule does not lend 
itself to a rational application.40 Yet even if strongly held preferences do not 
result in demands for a general change in the legal rules, WTO law’s acceptance 
(and possibly also its legitimacy) will be mitigated if it cannot accommodate 
such preferences.41 
Robert Howse, Joanna Langille, and Katie Sykes have recently argued that 
a number of such societal preferences that are highly context dependent and do 
not lend themselves to instrumental rationalization may be accommodated by 
the public-morals exception in Article XX(a) of the GATT.42 Yet this exception, 
even in the suggested broad interpretation, which the Appellate Body to some 
extent confirmed in the Seal Products case,43 has its limitations. Most 
importantly, it can only be invoked to justify prima facie violations of trade 
norms that result from measures taken to protect public morals, that is, 
“standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a 
community or nation.”44 It would be straining the concept of morality if one 
were to interpret, for example, experimental measures of economic policy as 
answering to standards of right and wrong. And a GMO ban, while it might be 
 
 38.  SPS Agreement, supra note 16, at art. 5, para. 7.  
 39.  Nicholas Perdikis, William A. Kerr & Jill E. Hobbs, Reforming the WTO to Defuse Potential 
Trade Conflicts in Genetically Modified Goods, 24 WORLD ECON. 379, 384 (2002). 
 40.  JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION 152 (2004); see also CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 2 (2005) (criticizing the 
precautionary principle as incoherent). Rationality of international law may be all the more important 
given its democratic deficit. 
 41.  Obviously, a state always has the option of defecting, which may be more or less costly given 
the defecting state’s power and the extent to which other state parties are affected.  
 42. Robert Howse & Joanna Langille, supra note 10; Robert Howse, Joanna Langille & Katie 
Sykes, Pluralism in Practice: Moral Legislation and the Law of the WTO After Seal Products, 48 GEO. 
WASH. INT’L L. R. 81 (2015). 
 43.  Reports of the Appellate Body, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the 
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS400/AB/R; WT/DS401/AB/R (May 22, 
2014). 
 44.  Report of the Panel, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services, para. 6.465, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004). 
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reformulated as based on moral concerns,45 is better understood as answering to 
a strong collective preference against a practice perceived to be potentially 
harmful to health and the environment. 
B. The WTO Waiver as an Exit Option to Realize Collective Preferences 
Various scholarly reform proposals address the potential tension between 
matters of general principle and societal preference in specific situations and 
contexts. Whereas some argue for a solution at the level of adjudication and law 
enforcement,46 others propose including further exception clauses into the WTO 
Agreements in order to justify measures based on strong societal preferences.47 
The following presents a number of the latter proposals in order to make the 
case that it may be better to use the waiver power to accommodate strongly 
held societal preferences than to add largely indeterminate exception clauses to 
WTO law. 
The proposals discussed here agree that additional exit options shall not 
permit measures that serve special interests but shall legalize measures that 
enjoy broad public support. In terms of subsidiarity, one may say that the 
proposed exceptions are meant to allow for deference to members’ authority in 
situations where there is a strong reason for the exercise of authority at the 
lower level, namely, wide public support. More specifically, Dani Rodrik 
proposes that deviations from the general rules are justified for policy measures 
that were the subject of an investigative process in which all relevant parties—
including consumer and public interest groups, importers, exporters, and civil 
society organizations—were heard and which revealed broad support for these 
measures.48 Pascal Lamy, by comparison, remains relatively vague and merely 
states that the measures to be justified by his proposed exception clause must be 
 
 45.  For an argument that a ban on GMOs could be justified by the public-morals exception in 
Article XX(a) GATT, see Gareth Davies, Morality Clauses and Decision-Making in Situations of 
Scientific Uncertainty: The Case of GMOs 11–13 (Hebrew Univ. Int’l Law, Research Paper No. 10-06, 
2006).  
 46.  See BHAGWATI, supra note 40, at 152 (suggesting that WTO members who adopt measures 
dictated by public opinion but inconsistent with WTO law should not be retaliated against but should 
instead make a tort payment to the injured industry); Jeffery Atik, Identifying Antidemocratic 
Outcomes: Authenticity, Self-Sacrifice, and International Trade, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 229, 234, 
261 (1998) (proposing a specific standard-of-review test for when a measure reflects a deeply embedded 
value that enjoys clear support of the population and if the member imposing the measure bears the 
greater part of the cost of the trade distortion caused by the measure).  
 47.  RODRIK, supra note 11, at 230–33. (proposing an Agreement on Developmental and Social 
Safeguards to allow for temporary deviation from the rules to pursue developmental policies or to 
protect social values); Nicholas Perdikis, William A. Kerr & Jill E. Hobbs, supra note 39, at 397 
(proposing a new WTO Agreement that would allow for trade barriers responding to consumer 
preferences); Pascal Lamy, The Emergence of Collective Preferences in International Trade: 
Implications for Regulating Globalisation, Speech at Conference on “Collective Preferences and Global 
Gouvernance: What Future for the Multilateral Trading System”, (Sept. 15, 2004),  
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/september/tradoc_118929.pdf (arguing that WTO law should 
allow for temporary nonprotectionist least-trade-restrictive measures that give effect to collective 
preferences). 
 48.  RODRICK, supra note 11, at 231. 
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based on collective preferences, which he defines as “the end result of choices 
made by human communities that apply to the community as a whole.”49 
Further, he states that collective preferences require “institutions capable of 
forging collective preferences.”50 Whereas both Dani Rodrik and Pascal Lamy 
explicitly51 or implicitly52 refer to democratic structures, Nicholas Perdikis, 
William Kerr, and Jill Hobbs merely require the demonstration of a sufficient 
level (in quantity and quality) of consumer concern in their proposal on 
exceptions for trade barriers based on consumer concern.53 It can be argued, 
however, that they, too, implicitly rely on democratic structures because outside 
such structures it will be difficult to determine whether a sufficient level of 
consumer concern is reached.54 
Because the proposals aim to ensure responsiveness of the WTO to strong 
domestic preferences without predetermining the content of such preferences, 
they mainly establish formal procedural requirements. They require that the 
respective preference is a collective preference55 tested in an inclusive 
investigation56 and broadly shared by consumers.57 With respect to the 
substantive content of the measures that can be justified by the proposed 
exceptions, the authors only state negative requirements. These include 
requirements that the respective measure shall not be more trade restrictive 
than necessary, shall not be protectionist, and shall not aim at the imposition of 
preferences on other societies.58 
The lack of positive substantive requirements coupled with an emphasis on 
inclusive procedures raises doubts as to whether the inclusion of such 
exceptions into an international legal regime is feasible or even desirable. It is 
true that international law increasingly takes an interest in democratic 
 
 49.  Lamy, supra note 47, at 2.  
 50.  Id. 
 51.  RODRIK, supra note 11, at 229 (“Nondemocratic countries cannot count on the same trade 
privileges as democratic ones.”). Rodrik also points out that the inclusive investigations he proposes as 
a requirement for his safeguards clause to apply rarely happen in practice, even in industrialized 
countries. Id. at 232. 
 52.  Pascal Lamy argues that “democratic societies are organised in such a way as to allow the 
emergence of ‘collective’ preferences, which synthesise the preferences of individuals through political 
debate and institutions. These preferences then become standards which apply to everyone and provide 
a framework for relations between individuals.” Lamy, supra note 47, at 2. He does not address 
whether collective preferences may be forged also in nondemocratic societies. See id. 
 53.  Perdikis, Kerr & Hobbs, supra note 39, at 395–97. 
 54.  Perdikis, Kerr, and Hobbs propose the establishment of a “professional, social science-based 
institution . . . to develop harmonized international procedures for evaluating the existence and 
intensity of consumer concerns.” Id. at 397. 
 55.  Lamy, supra note 47, at 2. 
 56.  RODRIK, supra note 11, at 232. 
 57.  Perdikis, Kerr & Hobbs, supra note 39, at 395–97. 
 58.  According to Rodrik’s proposal, if there is a strong preference within a WTO member for 
import restrictions to protect domestic food safety, labor, or environmental standards, such restrictions 
may be justified. They should not, however, be justified if they aim to impose these standards on other 
members. RODRIK, supra note 11, at 232. 
4-FEICHTNER INCORPORATED (DO NOT DELETE) 6/13/2016  3:12 PM 
86 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 79:75 
structures at the national level.59 Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that WTO 
members, including nondemocratic members, would agree to an exception 
clause that makes deliberative and inclusive policy-making processes a 
precondition for the clause to apply. Furthermore, the dispute-settlement 
organs appear ill suited to apply such standards.60 Against this background the 
exercise of the waiver power appears preferable to the creation of an additional 
exception clause. It already provides for a procedure that can be used to 
respond to domestic collective preferences and on its face is indifferent to 
domestic policy-making processes. 
IV 
THE WTO’S WAIVER PRACTICE: FALLING SHORT OF THE WAIVER’S 
SUBSIDIARITY POTENTIAL 
Before this article turns to the operationalization of the waiver power as an 
exit option to accommodate collective preferences, this part takes account of 
the waiver practice. An assessment of this practice reveals that the WTO’s 
political organs have made creative use of the waiver power and have exercised 
it for a number of purposes. Despite the consensus practice a good number of 
waiver decisions have been adopted. From the entry into force of the WTO 
Agreement in 1995 until the end of 2010, 202 waiver decisions (including 
extension decisions) were granted.61 Moreover, the requirement in Article IX 
Paragraph 3 of the WTO Agreement of the existence of “exceptional 
circumstances” does not appear to limit the exercise of the waiver power. Yet 
an examination of the waiver practice also reveals that it falls short of the 
waiver power’s subsidiarity potential. The following gives a brief overview of 
the different types of waivers that have been adopted and then focuses on the 
use of the waiver as an exception granted to individual members to realize 
collective preferences. 
The different types of waivers that can be distilled from practice fall into 
two groups—individual and collective waivers. Individual waivers encompass 
two types of waivers: (1) individual waivers granted to account for capacity 
problems62 and (2) individual waivers that allow members to pursue policy 
 
 59.  JEAN D’ASPREMONT. L’ETAT NON DÉMOCRATIQUE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL. ETUDE 
CRITIQUE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL POSITIF ET DE LA PRATIQUE CONTEMPORAINE (2008); NIELS 
PETERSEN, DEMOKRATIE ALS TELEOLOGISCHES PRINZIP. ZUR LEGITIMITÄT VON STAATSGEWALT 
IM VÖLKERRECHT (2009); Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AJIL 
46, 46 (1992).  
 60.  For such criticism directed at Pascal Lamy’s proposal for a collective-preferences exception, 
see Steve Charnovitz, An Analysis of Pascal Lamy’s Proposal on Collective Preferences, 8 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 449, 455–59 (2005). 
 61.  This number is derived from a note by the WTO Secretariat, Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Information on Waivers, WTO Doc. 
IP/C/W/387 (Oct. 24, 2002) (including in its Annex I a list of all waiver decisions granted in the WTO 
until October 15, 2002) and from WTO Annual Reports, http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ 
annual_report_e.htm.   
 62.  Individual waivers that take account of capacity problems include waivers that grant individual 
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preferences (potentially) inconsistent with WTO law.63 Collective waivers waive 
obligations for groups of members or all members. Three types of collective 
waivers exist: (1) collective waivers that defer the obligation to comply with 
certain norms for the benefit of developing countries to take account of their 
capacity problems;64 (2) collective waivers that modify legal rules and can be 
considered as legislative instruments, a prominent example being the TRIPS 
Waiver;65 and (3) collective waivers that provide exceptions from WTO law for 
measures mandated by another international legal regime, such as the 
Kimberley Waiver, which suspends WTO norms with respect to trade bans for 
rough diamonds that are taken in accordance with the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme.66 
From a subsidiarity perspective, the individual waiver that allows members 
to pursue domestic policy preferences (potentially) inconsistent with WTO law 
is most relevant.67 An examination of the waiver practice reveals that the 
 
members additional time to implement changes to the Harmonized System in their national customs 
nomenclature and to revise their tariff schedules accordingly. See Isabel Feichtner, The Administration 
of the Vocabulary of International Trade: The Adaptation of WTO Schedules to Changes in the 
Harmonized System, 9 GERMAN L.J. 1481, (2008). Further waivers in this group allow members to 
defer compliance with principles of customs valuation as laid out in Article VII GATT and the 
Agreement on Customs Valuation. They include, for example, Cape Verde—Implementation of Article 
VII of GATT 1994 of the Agreement on Customs Valuation, WTO Doc. WT/L/812 (May 4, 2011) 
(waiver granted to Cape Verde on May 3, 2011 and waiving Article VII GATT and the obligations of 
the Agreement on Customs Valuation for one year). Finally, individual waivers to address capacity 
problems are the waivers granted periodically to Cuba to waive its obligation under Article XV, para. 6 
GATT to become a member of the International Monetary Fund, Cuba—Article XV:6, WTO Doc. 
WT/L/678 (Dec. 19, 2006). 
 63.  On these waivers see infra, text accompanying notes 67–83. 
 64.  See Least-Developed Country Members—Obligations Under Article 70.9 of the TRIPS 
Agreement With Respect to Pharmaceutical Products, WTO Doc. WT/L/478 (July 12, 2002) (suspending 
the obligations of least-developed countries under Article 70.9 TRIPS Agreement with respect to 
pharmaceutical products until 2016). 
 65.  Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, WTO Doc. WT/L/540 (Sept. 2, 2003). Other waivers of this type are Preferential Tariff 
Treatment for Least-Developed Countries, WTO Doc. WT/L/759 (May 29, 2009) (creating an exception 
to Article I, para. 1 GATT to allow developing-country members to provide preferential tariff 
treatment to products from least-developed countries) and Preferential Treatment to Services and 
Service Suppliers of Least-Developed Countries, WTO Doc. WT/L/847 (Dec. 19, 2011) (creating an 
exception to Article II, para. 1 GATS for preferential treatment granted to services and service 
suppliers of least-developed countries).  
 66.  Waiver Concerning Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds, WTO Doc. 
WT/L/518 (May 27, 2003). Such collective waivers are adopted also to allow WTO members to 
implement changes to the Harmonized System made within the World Customs Organization. See, e.g., 
Introduction of Harmonized System 2007 Changes into WTO Schedules of Tariff Concessions, WTO 
Doc. WT/L/809 (Dec. 16, 2010). 
 67.  Collective waivers that address the allocation of authority between the WTO and other 
international legal regimes, such as the Kimberley Waiver, have also been assessed from a subsidiarity 
perspective. They have been interpreted as promoting a principle of horizontal subsidiarity (which 
however is not the focus of this contribution). See Isabel Feichtner, The Waiver Power of the WTO: 
Opening the WTO for Political Debate on the Reconciliation of Competing Interests, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
615, 642–43 (2009) (building on the concept of horizontal subsidiarity proposed by Robert Howse & 
Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or Global Subsidiarity?, 16 
GOVERNANCE 73 (2003)). 
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political organs of the WTO are reluctant to use the waiver power in order to 
open up policy space for members to realize collective preferences, to promote 
noneconomic interests, or to experiment with development policies. The bulk of 
individual waiver decisions currently adopted by the WTO for the realization of 
policy preferences are waivers that legalize trade preferences granted by 
developed WTO members to selected developing country members. These 
include, for example, waivers granted to the United States for its trade 
preference schemes under the African Growth and Opportunities Act68 or the 
Andean Trade Preferences Act.69 It is difficult to interpret these waivers as 
permitting the realization of domestic collective preferences, as they mainly 
allow governments to further certain foreign policy objectives. 
By contrast, waivers that could more easily be subsumed under a 
subsidiarity rationale because they legalize measures that pursue internal policy 
objectives have seldom been adopted. Exceptions are a number of waivers 
granted to WTO members to allow them to adopt or maintain measures for 
their internal economic development. Thus, a few individual waivers have 
permitted WTO members to maintain trade-related investment measures for a 
limited period of time beyond the end of the transitional period provided for in 
Article 5.2 of the Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) Agreement.70 
Another handful of waivers permitted WTO members to defer the 
implementation of commitments that were included in their accession 
protocols.71 Of the latter, a waiver granted to Mongolia is particularly 
 
 68. United States—African Growth and Opportunity Act, WTO Doc. WT/L/754 (May 29, 2009). 
 69. United States—Andean Trade Preference Act, WTO Doc. WT/L/755 (May 29, 2009). Further 
waivers to legalize trade preferences are: United States —Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 
WTO Doc. WT/L/753 (May 29, 2009) (legalizing U.S. preferences under the Caribbean Basin 
Economic Recovery Act); Caribcan, WTO Doc. WT/L/677 (Dec. 19, 2009) (legalizing Canadian 
preferences under CARIBCAN); European Communities—Application of Autonomous Preferential 
Treatment to Moldova, WTO Doc. WT/L/722 (May 15, 2008) (legalizing EU preferences for Moldova); 
European Communities’ Preferences for Albania, Bosnia And Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and 
Montenegro, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, WTO Doc. WT/L/654 (Aug. 2, 2006) 
(legalizing EU preferences for Western Balkans); European Communities—The ACP–EC Partnership 
Agreement, WTO Doc. WT/L/436 (Dec. 7, 2001) (legalizing EU preferences under the Cotonou 
Agreement). 
 70.  Thailand—Extension of the Transition Period for the Elimination of Trade-Related Investment 
Measures Notified Under Article 5.1 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, WTO 
Doc. WT/L/410 (Aug. 7, 2001) (waiver granted to Thailand in 2001). Also see the seven extension 
decisions adopted by the Council for Trade in Goods in July 2001 on the basis of the TRIMs 
Agreement, not the waiver power in Article IX, para. 3 WTO Agreement. Extension of the Transition 
Period for the Elimination of Trade-Related Investment Measures Notified Under Article 5.1 of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, WTO Docs G/L/460-466 (Aug. 7, 2001). Further 
extensions were granted by the Council for Trade in Goods beginning in November 2001 until 
December 31, 2003. See Extension of the Transition Period for the Elimination of Trade-Related 
Investment Measures Notified Under Article 5.1 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures, WTO Docs G/L/497-504 (Nov. 9, 2001). A further waiver was granted to Colombia. See 
Colombia—Extension of the Application of Article 5.2 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures, WTO Doc. WT/L/441 (Jan. 10, 2002).   
 71. Cape Verde—Implementation of the Schedule of Concessions, WTO Doc. WT/L/768 (July 31, 
2009) (allowing Cape Verde to defer implementation of tariff concessions); Mongolia—Export Duties 
on Raw Cashmere, WTO Doc. WT/L/695 (Aug. 1, 2007) [hereinafter Mongolia, WT/L/695] (allowing 
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noteworthy from an economic-development perspective. It allowed Mongolia, 
which had committed in its accession protocol to dismantle export duties on raw 
cashmere within ten years of accession, to maintain such duties for an additional 
five-year period.72 The maintenance of export duties enabled the country, 
according to its own assessment, to contain price fluctuations for cashmere and 
to develop and expand its cashmere-processing industry.73 
A recent waiver process concerning a request by the Philippines 
demonstrates the obstacles to a more extensive use of the WTO waiver power 
to accommodate domestic development policies and other policy preferences of 
individual WTO members. The Philippines requested a waiver of its obligations 
under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture74 to allow it to maintain 
quantitative restrictions on rice imports.75 It justified its request both with the 
need to continue protecting domestic rice farmers from foreign competition 
until the farmers become more competitive and also with the desire to promote 
food security through self-sufficiency with respect to rice.76 The waiver was 
formally requested in March 2012.77 It then took until July 2014—more than two 
years—before the General Council adopted a waiver.78 From the minutes of the 
meetings of the Council for Trade in Goods,79 it appears that the obstacles to 
the formation of consensus were not objections to the usefulness of quantitative 
restrictions from the standpoint of economic development80 nor objections 
related to matters of principle (such as irreconcilability of the restrictions with 
WTO objectives), but rather countervailing economic interests of a number of 
rice-exporting WTO members.81 
 
Mongolia to maintain export duties on raw cashmere until January 29, 2012); Albania—Implementation 
of Specific Concessions, WTO Doc. WT/L/610 (May 30, 2005) (allowing Albania to defer privatization 
of the telephone sector and implementation of certain tariff concessions); Albania—Implementation of 
Specific Commitments in Telecommunications Services, WTO Doc. WT/L/567 (June 7, 2004); 
Hungary—Agreement on Agriculture, WTO Doc. WT/L/238 (Oct. 29, 1997) (allowing Hungary to 
maintain certain export subsidies for agricultural products until December 31, 2001).   
 72.  Mongolia, WT/L/695, at 1. 
 73.  Communication from Mongolia, Mongolia—Export Duties on Raw Cashmere, WTO Doc. 
WT/GC/W/638, at 2 (Sept. 27, 2011) [hereinafter Mongolia, WT/GC/W/638]. 
 74.  Agreement on Agriculture art. 4.2, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410.  
 75.  Council for Trade in Goods, Request for Waiver Relating to Special Treatment for Rice of the 
Philippines, WTO Doc. G/C/W/665/Rev.4 (Mar. 27, 2014) [hereinafter Waiver Request Rev. 4]. 
 76.  Id. at 1. 
 77.  Council for Trade in Goods, Request for Waiver on Special Treatment for Rice of the 
Philippines, WTO Doc. G/C/W/665 (Mar. 20, 2012). The Philippines requested a waiver to avoid a 
protracted debate on whether an extension of its special treatment of rice could be based on Annex 5 of 
the Agreement on Agriculture. See Council for Trade in Goods, Minutes of the Meeting of the Council 
for Trade in Goods, para. 97, WTO Doc. G/C/M/110 (June 15, 2012). 
 78.  See General Council, Minutes of the Meeting, WTO Doc. WT/GC/M/152 at 45 (Oct. 9, 2014). 
The waiver decision, which expires on June 30, 2017, is included in General Council, Decision on 
Waiver Relating to Special Treatment for Rice of the Philippines, WTO Doc. WT/L/932 (July 25, 2014). 
 79.  According to WTO Agreement, the Council for Trade in Goods considers requests for waivers 
of GATT obligations.   
 80.  For such objections, see, for example, Philippine Institute for Development Studies, Putting 
Rice on the Table: Rice Policy, the WTO, and Food Security 3 (Policy Notes No. 2011-11, May 2011). 
 81.  See Council for Trade in Goods, Minutes of the Meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods, 
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No open multilateral debate was conducted on the questions of whether the 
WTO’s authority should be restricted in order to allow the Philippines to 
protect its rice farmers from foreign competition or whether such protection 
could be considered a collective preference enjoying broad public support in the 
Philippines. Rather, the request triggered an intransparent bargaining process 
between the Philippines and a number of WTO members that argued a waiver 
would negatively affect their export interests. To accommodate these concerns, 
the Philippines had requested that any member with a substantial interest in 
rice communicate this interest to the Philippines.82 Consequently, a process of 
bilateral negotiations between the Philippines and interested members ensued, 
leading to several revisions by the Philippines of its waiver request, in particular 
the envisaged country-specific quotas for rice imports.83 
This kind of process in response to individual waiver requests is not 
uncommon in the WTO. Waiver decisions are mostly prepared in informal 
meetings, and the process is strongly influenced by particular trade interests. 
V 
THE WAIVER PROCESS: HOW TO IMPROVE IT TO ENHANCE DEFERENCE TO 
COLLECTIVE PREFERENCES 
If the waiver is to be operationalized as an instrument to further subsidiarity 
in international economic governance, the waiver process should do two things: 
first, it should assess whether the measures for which waivers are requested are 
expressions of collective preferences (that is, policy preferences that enjoy 
broad public support); and second, it should increase the likelihood that the 
political organs deciding on waiver requests grant waivers to accommodate 
collective preferences, as long as this does not endanger the objectives of the 
WTO. An inquiry whether measures are based on collective preferences and 
responsiveness to collective preferences depend on the inclusiveness and 
transparency of the waiver process. Today’s waiver processes do not correspond 
to this ideal; rather, they are characterized by intransparency, informality, and 
bilateral negotiations. In the following, the current features of the waiver 
process are explored with reference to the ideals of inclusiveness and 
transparency. The article suggests that coupling the existing reason-giving 
requirements84 with an assessment of waiver requests by working parties, as was 
 
paras. 5.4, 5.7–5.8, WTO Doc. G/C/M/116 (Mar. 11, 2014) (stating the objections to the adoption of the 
waiver by the United States, Thailand, and Canada for reasons of ongoing bilateral negotiations). 
 82.  Committee on Agriculture, Notification of Initiation of Negotiations on Continuation of Special 
Treatment for Rice, Communication from the Philippines, WTO Doc. G/AG/W/91 (Nov. 22, 2011). 
 83.  Waiver Request Rev. 4, supra note 75; Council for Trade in Goods, Request for Waiver 
Relating to Special Treatment for Rice of the Philippines, WTO Doc. G/C/W/665/Rev.3 (Oct. 17, 2013); 
Council for Trade in Goods, Request for Waiver Relating to Special Treatment for Rice of the 
Philippines, WTO Doc. G/C/W/665/Rev.2 (Oct. 8, 2013); Council for Trade in Goods, Request for 
Waiver Relating to Special Treatment for Rice of the Philippines, WTO Doc. G/C/W/665/Rev.1 (Nov. 16, 
2012).  
 84.  Giving reasons is required by the Waiver Understanding for the waiver request and by Article 
IX, para. 4 WTO Agreement for the waiver decision. 
4-FEICHTNER INCORPORATED (DO NOT DELETE) 6/13/2016  3:12 PM 
No. 2 2016] SUBSIDIARITY IN THE WTO: THE PROMISE OF WAIVERS 91 
common practice under the GATT of 1947, would greatly improve the waiver 
process. Further, the article proposes a departure from the consensus practice 
and a return to voting on waivers. 
These suggestions do not include any substantive principles to assess waiver 
requests. As discussed above, the particular potential of the waiver procedure 
lies in the fact that it does not establish any generalized substantive criteria as to 
which measures merit legalization by a waiver and which do not. 
A. Inclusiveness of the Waiver Process 
Inclusiveness of the waiver process is important in two dimensions. First, the 
waiver process must not be biased in favor of more powerful members, so that 
all WTO members can benefit from the waiver power. Access of developing 
countries is particularly important if the waiver is to play a larger role in the 
realization of development preferences. Second, the waiver process should 
include the views of nongovernmental actors and other international 
institutions that represent societal interests currently not as well represented by 
governments as organized industry or labor interests.85 Such inclusiveness will 
facilitate the assessment whether a measure for which a waiver is being 
requested enjoys wide public support. 
With respect to the accessibility of the waiver process for developing 
countries, it is important to note that Article IX Paragraph 3 of the WTO 
Agreement formally affords each WTO member the right to submit a waiver 
request. This right enables WTO members, developed and developing members 
alike, to put any matter on the agenda of the competent WTO organ as long as 
it is phrased as a request for the suspension of an obligation and indicates the 
reasons why a waiver is requested. This agenda-setting opportunity provided for 
by the waiver power is of particular importance to developing country members 
as these members often experience difficulties having their concerns heard and 
discussed in formal meetings.86 
Nonetheless, looking at the past, the GATT and the WTO may be accused 
of double standards in their waiver practice. With respect to the GATT of 1947, 
Robert Hudec pointed out how developing countries were still required to 
request waivers if they wanted to deviate from the rules after legal discipline 
had largely broken down in the 1960s and 1970s, while developed country 
members openly violated the law.87 Double standards are also apparent when 
 
 85.  On the strong impact of these interests on trade law, see Dani Rodrik, The Global Governance 
of Trade as if Development Really Mattered (Report Submitted to the United Nations Development 
Programme, 2001), http://www.giszpenc.com/globalciv/rodrik1.pdf. On the strong impact of special 
interests on international lawmaking by governments, see Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of 
Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 167, 170–71 (1999).  
 86. See Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and 
the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 598, 612 (2007) (discussing the difficulties of 
weak states in convening negotiations on treaty amendments).  
 87.  ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 227 
(1975). 
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comparing the waivers that have been granted to developed country members 
with those granted to developing country members. Whereas there is a rather 
large practice in the WTO to grant waivers for the realization of foreign policy 
preferences to developed country members (namely to legalize special trade 
preferences extended to selected developing countries),88 the practice to grant 
waivers for the realization of policy preferences to developing country members 
is very limited and only encompasses a few waivers to extend transition periods 
and to defer compliance with specific accession commitments.89 
Inclusiveness of the waiver process with respect to nongovernmental views 
can be enhanced through the participation of actors other than government 
representatives. Apart from WTO members, international organizations 
admitted as observers90 can express their opinions on a waiver request within 
the WTO organs dealing with the request.91 The process that led to the adoption 
of the TRIPS Waiver demonstrates that a waiver process can prompt a debate 
that includes not only government representatives, but also other international 
institutions and NGOs.92 Thus, when the TRIPS Waiver was debated in the 
TRIPS Council, representatives from the World Health Organization, the Joint 
United Nations Programme on HIV–AIDS, and the Holy See actively 
participated by making legislative proposals and by providing information and 
moral guidance.93 NGOs, which may not be directly admitted as observers, can 
participate indirectly by informing, scrutinizing, and potentially scandalizing the 
process.94 The opportunity for such indirect participation depends on the 
transparency of the waiver process. 
B. Transparency of the Waiver Process 
Currently waiver processes are quite intransparent. This is mainly due to the 
restricted publication of minutes of meetings in which waiver requests are being 
discussed and because many waiver requests are the subject of bilateral 
negotiations rather than multilateral debate. 
Prior to the formal adoption of waivers by the General Council (and 
seldom, by the Ministerial Conference), requests are usually considered by the 
 
 88.  See supra note 69. 
 89.  See supra notes 70–71. 
 90.  The guidelines on observer status in the WTO are, however, relatively restrictive and subject 
to criticism also among the WTO membership. Rules of Procedure for Sessions of the Ministerial 
Conference and Meetings of the General Council, WTO Doc. WT/L/161, Annex 3 (July 25, 1996). 
 91.  Id. at para. 8. 
 92.  Feichtner, supra note 67, at 625–27. 
 93.  See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop. Rights, Minutes of Meeting, para. 
47, WTO Doc. IP/C/M/38 (Feb. 5, 2003); Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop. 
Rights, Minutes of Meeting, para. 5, WTO Doc. IP/C/M/37 (Oct. 11, 2002); Council for Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Prop. Rights, Minutes of Meeting, paras. 124–27, WTO Doc. IP/C/M/36 (July 18, 
2002). 
 94. See OREN PEREZ, ECOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY AND GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM. 
RETHINKING THE TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT CONFLICT 100–05 (2004) (discussing the role of NGOs 
in providing nonpoliticized information to the WTO). 
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lower organs; in the case of the Philippines’ request of a waiver to legalize 
quantitative restrictions on rice imports, these organs were the Council for 
Trade in Goods and the Committee on Agriculture. While the meeting minutes 
of the General Council and the Council for Trade in Goods are published (as 
are the minutes of the Council for Trade in Services and the TRIPS Council), 
the Committee on Agriculture’s minutes are not. Yet even where minutes are 
published, they are not always informative with respect to members’ positions 
on waiver requests, as most debates take place in informal meetings and 
bilateral negotiations. It is those negotiations that are frequently (as in the 
Philippines’ case) decisive for the eventual success of waiver requests. The 
resulting intransparency of the waiver process makes it very difficult for 
external observers to assess objections to a waiver request or to indirectly 
participate in the debate, for example, by publicly rebutting objections. 
There exist, however, two important procedural requirements that may 
ensure some transparency. One is found in Article IX Paragraph 3(b) of the 
WTO Agreement. This provision sets out a time limit for the consideration of 
waiver requests, which is not to exceed ninety days.95 The rules of procedure of 
the specialized councils for the GATT, the GATS, and the TRIPS Agreement 
provide that matters lacking consensus shall be transferred to the General 
Council.96 As a consequence, if no consensus is achieved within ninety days in 
the council initially addressing the waiver request, the issue moves up to the 
General Council. Referral to the General Council gives waiver requests more 
visibility. Thus, when no consensus had formed in the Council for Trade in 
Goods within ninety days of the submission of the initial waiver request by the 
Philippines, the chairman of the Council for Trade in Goods reported to the 
General Council on the status of the waiver process.97 The placing of the waiver 
request on the agenda of the General Council afforded the Philippines the 
opportunity to present to the General Council the reasons why it requested the 
waiver.98 
The other avenue to enhance the transparency of waiver processes is the 
annual review of waivers. Article IX Paragraph 4 of the WTO Agreement 
provides that “[a]ny waiver granted for a period of more than one year shall be 
reviewed by the Ministerial Conference not later than one year after it is 
granted, and thereafter annually until the waiver terminates.” In practice, these 
 
 95.  In practice, this requirement does not always lead to a timely consideration. For example, the 
consideration of the European Community’s request for a waiver for trade preferences granted under 
the Cotonou Agreement was substantially delayed because members opposing the waiver argued that 
the request did not meet the procedural requirements. See Council for Trade in Goods, Minutes of the 
Meeting, WTO Doc. G/C/M/44 at 18 (Oct. 30, 2000). 
 96.  See, e.g., General Council, Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the Council for Trade in Goods, 
WTO Doc. WT/L/79, Rule 33 (Aug. 7, 1995). 
 97.  General Council, Minutes of the Meeting, para. 167, WTO Doc. WT/GC/M/137 (Sept. 13, 
2012).  
 98.  In this case, the General Council agreed to allow the Council for Trade in Goods to continue 
consideration of the Philippines’s request and to report back once it had concluded the matter. Id. at 
para. 170. 
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reviews are conducted by the General Council. For a member that wishes to 
request an extension of a waiver, these reviews offer an opportunity to report 
on the implementation and effects of the measure for which the waiver was 
granted. Moreover, such reports may have an impact on the assessment of 
future waiver requests. For example, the positive account of Mongolia’s 
experience with export duties on cashmere, which were legalized by a waiver,99 
may provide arguments in favor of the adoption of further waivers to legalize 
export restrictions in order to promote the establishment of processing 
industries for natural resources in developing countries.100 
C. Reinstatement of the GATT Working Party Procedure 
The transparency of waiver processes and the likelihood that waiver 
requests are addressed in a multilateral debate could be significantly increased 
if the WTO returned to the working party procedure of the GATT. Under the 
GATT of 1947, it was common practice that, upon the submission of a waiver 
request, a working party was established. Participation in the working party was 
open to all interested contracting parties.101 Usually, the working party, after a 
question-and-answer process and consideration of the request, issued a report 
that was drafted by the Secretariat. This working party report listed all relevant 
documents, including the request and relevant domestic legislation. It 
summarized the position of the requesting contracting party as well as the 
opinions formed in the working party, giving a detailed picture of diverging 
views on factual, policy, and legal questions. Annexes to the working party 
report included relevant documents and—unless the working party was of the 
view that the requested waiver should not be adopted—a draft waiver decision. 
When the working party was of the view that a request should be granted, it 
recommended adoption of a waiver to the CONTRACTING PARTIES.102 
 
 99.  Mongolia, WT/GC/W/638. 
 100.  Although WTO law prohibits export quotas, it generally does not prohibit export duties. Yet 
prohibitions of duties on raw materials exports have been included in a number of accession protocols, 
such as the one for Mongolia. 
 101.  The Working Party that examined the U.S. request for a waiver of Article I GATT of 1947 
with respect to CBERA preferences was open also to CBERA-eligible beneficiary countries who were 
not GATT contracting parties. Report, Working Party on United States Caribbean Basin Economic 
Recovery Act (CBERA), para. 2, GATT Doc. L/5708 (Oct. 26, 1984). Generally excepted from this 
practice to examine waiver requests in working parties were requests concerning the adaptation of 
GATT schedules to the Harmonized System. Because these waiver decisions were routinely and 
frequently granted, they were considered by the GATT Committee on Tariff Concessions but not by 
specially established working parties. When the European Community requested a waiver for trade 
preferences to be granted to trading partners of the former German Democratic Republic after 
German unification, it opposed the establishment of a working party for time reasons. This prompted 
critique by the United States, which asked other contracting parties to support its request for the 
establishment of a working party as a precondition to any decision on a waiver. See Council, Minutes of 
Meeting, GATT Doc. C/M/246, 6 (Nov. 23, 1990). When the European Community nonetheless 
requested a vote on the waiver decision, the United States voted against it. After the adoption of the 
waiver decision, a working party was established to examine the preferences legalized by the waiver 
decision. 
 102.  In a few instances, working parties did not recommend the adoption of a waiver. In two cases 
4-FEICHTNER INCORPORATED (DO NOT DELETE) 6/13/2016  3:12 PM 
No. 2 2016] SUBSIDIARITY IN THE WTO: THE PROMISE OF WAIVERS 95 
The working party reports were formally adopted by the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES and published.103 They constitute an important documentation of the 
reasons and objectives justifying the waiver request, the views of individual 
contracting parties with respect to the waiver in question, the interpretation by 
the working party of the legal requirements of the waiver competence, and 
general waiver practice. Yet with the establishment of the WTO and the 
adoption of the consensus practice with respect to waiver decisions, the 
GATT’s working party practice was largely abandoned. Only once was a 
working party constituted in the WTO to consider a waiver request, namely the 
request by the European Community and African, Caribbean, and Pacific states 
in 2001 for a waiver for trade preferences granted under the Cotonou 
Agreement.104 
Reinstating the working party procedure would enhance the likelihood that 
the reasons that support a waiver request, as well as the objections against 
granting a waiver, are tested in a multilateral debate. Article IX Paragraph 4 of 
the WTO Agreement demands that a waiver decision “state the exceptional 
circumstances justifying the decision.” Currently waiver decisions are not very 
elaborate in this respect. Yet if waiver requests were debated in a working 
party, the reason-giving requirement would gain importance as the working 
party would need to document in its concluding report the reasons for waiver 
requests and how it discussed and evaluated them. 
In case a waiver request concerns measures based on development policy or 
particular poverty-alleviation programs, the requesting member could include 
in its request the opinions of experts from NGOs or other international 
institutions. On this basis, an inclusive, transparent, and reasoned debate could 
test whether the waiver request is indeed broadly supported within the 
requesting WTO member state or, rather, is backed by narrow special interests. 
A similar argument was made by Kenneth Dam with respect to the U.S. request 
for a waiver of Article I Paragraph 1 of the GATT of 1947 to allow the 
economic integration of the Canadian and U.S. car industries.105 A principled 
examination of the waiver request would have revealed, according to Dam, that  
 
 
the requesting member withdrew the request. The European Community withdrew its request for a 
waiver to legalize preferences for citrus fruit, Report of the Working Party on Citrus Fruit, GATT Doc. 
L/3281 (Dec. 5, 1969), and Greece withdrew its request to legalize preferences for steel from the Soviet 
Union, Report of the Working Party on Greek Tariff Quotas, GATT Doc. L/3447 (Oct. 14, 1970). In the 
other two instances, the United States proceeded to put its requests for the Automotive and CBERA 
Waivers to a vote by the CONTRACTING PARTIES who adopted waiver decisions. Caribbean Basin 
Economic Recovery Act, GATT Doc. L/5779 (Feb. 20, 1985). United States Imports of Automotive 
Products, GATT Doc. L/2528 (Dec. 28, 1965). 
 103.  Working party reports were published in the Basic Instruments and Selected Documents 
Supplements. 
 104.  Council for Trade in Goods, Minutes of the Meeting, para. 3.1, WTO Doc. G/C/M/53 (Nov. 14, 
2001). 
 105.  CONTRACTING PARTIES, United States Imports of Automotive Products, GATT Doc. 
L/2528 (Dec. 28, 1965). 
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the measures in question benefited the car industry, but that they did not 
reduce prices for the benefit of consumers. He goes on to state, 
One may . . . suspect that if the GATT waiver exercise had been more serious and 
more penetrating, and if, to take the suggestion one step further, there had been an 
independent international body to examine from an overall point of view the 
implications of the agreement, there might have been more vocal and effective 
criticism of the preferential arrangement within the United States and Canada.
106
 
It might, thus, be argued that the examination of a waiver request by a 
working party may even have a democracy-enhancing effect domestically. 
Assessment of waiver requests by working parties would also impose some 
discipline on members objecting to a waiver. They no longer would have the 
option to just veto a waiver, but would instead be forced to verbalize their 
objections. Through publication in the report, these objections would be 
exposed to scrutiny and critique beyond the working party. Arguably, 
objections merely based on particularistic concerns of individual members 
would be less likely to stand scrutiny than objections that address the 
implications of a waiver for the realization of WTO objectives. 
Finally, the documentation of the debates on waiver requests in working 
party reports would provide guidance for future waiver examinations. It would 
strengthen the precedential effects of waiver processes by creating a 
justificatory burden for future processes. Even though there is no legal 
obligation to treat like waiver requests alike, documented waiver practice might 
give rise to an expectation among the membership that the WTO does not 
deviate from its practice without good reasons. 
D. Return to Voting on Waivers 
A final reform proposal concerns the adoption of waiver decisions by vote. 
The WTO Agreement does not prohibit voting on waivers—an exception being 
waivers of obligations that are subject to a transitional period or a period for 
staged implementation which require consensus.107 The General Council 
decision of 1995 on decisionmaking on accessions and waivers, which states that 
waiver decisions shall be adopted by consensus, clarifies that a WTO member 
may request a vote at the time the decision is taken.108 Therefore, the General 
Council could return to the GATT practice of voting on waivers. A return to 
voting could make the waiver process more responsive to members’ collective 
preferences as decisionmaking by majority vote would prevent individual 
members from obstructing the adoption of waivers with their veto.109 
 
 106.  DAM, supra note 23, at 50.  
 107.  WTO Agreement, supra note 3, at art. IX, para. 3 n.4. 
 108.  Statement by the Chairman, Decision-Making Procedures Under Articles IX and XII of the 
WTO Agreement, WTO Doc. WT/L/93 (Nov. 4, 1995).  
 109.  As the waiver does not foreclose the admissibility of nonviolation complaints, outvoted 
members that incur actual damages due to a measure legalized by a waiver could seek redress under the 
nonviolation procedure. See Feichtner, supra note 1 at 259–70.  
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VI 
CONCLUSION 
This article lays out the subsidiarity potential of the WTO’s waiver power in 
Article IX Paragraph 3 of the WTO Agreement, namely its potential to 
enhance the responsiveness of the WTO to societal preferences without 
endangering the objective of multilateral trade discipline.  The features of the 
waiver power—that any WTO member can request a waiver, that the measures 
or situations for which waivers can be granted are not prescribed, and that 
waiver requests are considered by the political organs of the WTO—make the 
waiver a particularly attractive instrument from a subsidiarity perspective. 
Whenever there exists a strong collective preference within a WTO member for 
a particular measure that might violate WTO law, this member can request a 
waiver. Thus, the waiver power provides an exit option from WTO law to 
accommodate societal preferences and highly context-specific democratic 
experimentation to further economic development. At the same time, the 
requirement for approval of waiver requests via political procedure ensures that 
WTO members do not deviate from WTO norms as they wish, but that their 
requests are instead subject to scrutiny. The waiver process provides an 
opportunity for WTO members to debate how the borders between the WTO’s 
authority and its members’ authority should be drawn. This is a question that, in 
an organization like the WTO that aims at managing the interface between 
different national and regional economic systems and between trade and 
nontrade issues, can be settled only temporarily and should remain open to 
contestation and political deliberation. 
Yet to realize the potential of the waiver power to implement subsidiarity in 
the WTO, the waiver process must be reformed. Only if it becomes more 
inclusive and transparent, and subjects waiver requests to multilateral debate, 
can it effectively test both whether individual waiver requests are justified by 
collective preferences and whether granting a waiver would be compatible with 
WTO objectives. It would be an important step toward a process more likely to 
realize subsidiarity were the WTO to revert to the practice under the GATT of 
1947 to assess waiver requests in working parties and to adopt waiver decisions 
by vote. 
